This photo clearly demonstrates the reasons for the loss of combat helicopters of the RF Armed Forces in the NVO zone

The results of the use of combat helicopters during a special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine are largely contradictory. On the one hand, they talk about the high efficiency of these machines, showing shots of destroyed enemy equipment, on the other hand, the vulnerability of combat helicopters to modern air defense (air defense) systems is quite high.

According to Ukrainian data, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) have already lost several dozens of Ka-52 and Mi-28N combat helicopters during the NMD. Of course, these figures are clearly overestimated, but there is no doubt that there are losses of Russian combat helicopters. Cases of defeat of Russian combat helicopters were noted both with the help of portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), provided in abundance to the armed forces of Ukraine (APU) by Western countries, and anti-tank systems (ATGM) of the second generation “Stugna-P” developed and manufactured Ukrainian military-industrial complex (OPK).

Shot down in Ukraine Russian combat helicopter Ka-52

The loss of expensive combat vehicles from much cheaper means of destruction can lead to the conclusion that the era of combat helicopters is over, and that their tasks will be solved by other means, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but in reality everything is not so simple.

If we talk only about combat helicopters, leaving out reconnaissance, transport, transport-combat and other specialized models, then we can distinguish two main tasks they solve – fire support for ground forces and counteraction to enemy armored vehicles.

Based on this, in the twentieth century, the main specialization of a combat helicopter was formed – an anti-tank combat helicopter or a fire support combat helicopter. At the same time, over time, the difference in the design of an anti-tank combat helicopter and a fire support combat helicopter was increasingly erased, in fact, it began to be determined by the composition of weapons, which can be changed depending on the task.

The Franco-German attack helicopter “Tiger” was produced in versions designed for solving anti-tank missions, and in versions optimized for fire support of ground units

History the creation and development of combat helicopters, as well as their weapons, we have previously considered in the materials A helicopter against the tank. Standoff more than half a century long и Russian military helicopters and their weapons. History, present and future.

Let’s look at them in the context of solving the problems of fire support and countering enemy armored vehicles, as well as their impact on the survival of rotary-winged combat vehicles.

Combat helicopters for fire support

The use of helicopters to solve the problems of fire support for ground forces is a natural continuation of the experience of using attack aircraft during the Second World War (WWII).

Unlike aircraft, combat helicopters for fire support could be based in close proximity to the front line or combat zone. The helicopter does not need prepared airfields, a jump airfield is enough – a relatively flat area, fuel tanks and a small ammunition depot.

Proximity to the battlefield allows fire support helicopters to arrive at the battlefield faster than aircraft, which have a much higher speed. The lower speed of the helicopter and the possibility of hovering allows you to better identify targets, reduces the risks of “friendly fire”.

Bell AH-1 Cobra (“Cobra”) – primarily a combat helicopter for fire support, a narrow silhouette minimizes the likelihood of being hit by enemy oncoming fire during an attack

For the first time, the effectiveness of combat helicopters for fire support was revealed during the US invasion of Vietnam, and then it was confirmed during the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The main weapons of combat helicopters for fire support were machine guns, rapid-fire automatic cannons and unguided aviation rockets (NAR).

Mi-24P – Soviet transport and combat helicopter, actually a fire support helicopter with the ability to transport troops – the USSR did not have “clean” fire support helicopters or anti-tank helicopters at that time

Of course, as in the case of WWII attack aircraft, combat helicopters of fire support were subjected to enemy return fire, primarily from small arms weapons and anti-aircraft artillery systems (ZAK). A little later, MANPADS were added to them, which significantly changed the balance of power on the battlefield.

Anti-tank combat helicopters

The anti-tank specialization of combat helicopters originated simultaneously with the advent of anti-tank systems that hit armored targets with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Since WWII, Soviet armored hordes have terrified Western leaders. Quantity tanks in service with the USSR reached tens of thousands, not counting armored personnel carriers (APCs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) and other ground combat and auxiliary vehicles. The appearance of anti-tank systems seemed (and became) a very effective asymmetric response to the threat of massive use of armored forces by the enemy.

Production of tanks in the USSR by years

Combat helicopters have become one of the most effective carriers of anti-tank systems. They could move quickly in the combat zone and destroy several enemy tanks in one sortie.

Boeing AH-64 Apache (“Apache”) – anti-tank combat helicopter, one of the best of its kind, too expensive and lightly armored to go on it in “frontal” attacks

Mi-28N – Russian counterpart of the American AN-64 Apache, conceptually similar in many respects to it, but much better armored

Of course, every action gives rise to counteraction – in addition to the above-mentioned MANPADS, specialized short-range and short-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) specially designed to hit low-flying targets, including combat helicopters, began to enter service with the leading countries of the world. Standing apart in this row is the Russian anti-aircraft missile and gun system (ZRPK) “Tunguska”, capable of fighting air targets both with the help of two rapid-fire automatic guns, which practically do not have a minimum “dead” zone, and with the help of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) , having a greater firing range than all ATGMs of that time.

ZRPK “Tunguska”

The long range and flight speed of missiles, compared to ATGMs, seemed to tip the scales again in favor of ground forces, however, unlike fire support helicopters, which had to face anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS in real combat operations, anti-tank helicopters failed to face the latest air defense systems and air defense systems in real combat operations, therefore it was not possible to determine the winner in the duel “combat helicopter against air defense systems”.

However, these are problems of future conflicts; for us, the current reality in the NWO format is more important.

Combat helicopters in the NVO zone

The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have or have very few air defense systems capable of counteracting modern combat helicopters. However, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have more than enough MANPADS, ZAK and small arms capable of attacking combat helicopters at short range.

Moreover, never in the history of mankind has such a concentration of modern, high-tech MANPADS been achieved as in the NVO zone on the territory of Ukraine.

It can be assumed that most of the Russian combat helicopters were lost either during attacks using unguided weapons, or when entering the depth of enemy territory. Based on this, it is possible to significantly reduce the loss of combat helicopters by fulfilling several conditions:

The first is not to use combat helicopters over positions, and preferably over enemy territory in general, which is not under the control of its ground forces.

As an exception, rotorcraft raids at night at low altitude deep into enemy territory to destroy some especially important targets can be considered, however, this is more of a special operation, not a combined arms battle.

Secondly, combat helicopters must operate in the zone of domination, albeit partial, of their aviation.

Helicopters can fight aircraft, but still this is the exception rather than the rule.

The third is a complete rejection of the use of unguided weapons, excluding cases of self-defense using an automatic gun.

Correct ammunition Ka-52

It’s completely. Abandoning both suicidal attacks in the style of WWII attack aircraft to directly support troops with unguided weapons, and ineffective, senseless NAR launches from a roll-up “into milk”.

Moreover, it is necessary to completely abandon the use of unguided weapons from modern combat aircraft – even during the bombing of bearded terrorists in Syria, ruining the resource of high-tech machines for dropping “cast iron” is just a crime, just look at the cost of a flight hour of modern combat aircraft and helicopters to understand it. To use cheap unguided weapons, equally cheap carriers with a low cost of operation and flight hour are needed.

How then to support ground units?

If we are talking about enemy armored vehicles, then by launching ATGMs from a safe distance, and if we are talking about manpower or fortifications, then with the help of cannon and rocket artillery, as well as kamikaze UAVs.

But after all, artillery can also hit enemy armored vehicles with guided munitions.

Yes, but artillery does not have the same tactical mobility as attack helicopters. Groups of combat helicopters can operate in a zone with a radius of several hundred kilometers, eliminating breakthroughs of enemy armored vehicles, but will it be possible to provide this with artillery?

It was the Ukrainian counter-offensive that showed how effectively combat helicopters can solve anti-tank missions.

Where, then, to put the NAR launchers and the missiles themselves?

Potentially, they can be converted into guided weapons, as BAE Systems did with the Hydra NAR, which we have already discussed in the material The problem of the high cost of precision-guided munitions and ways to solve it.

NAR “Hydra” modified into guided missiles

Most likely, their development and production will take a long time, which we do not have, because the SVO is already underway, so there is another way out – the deployment of NAR launchers (PU) on ground carriers.

MTLB with 22-charge shipborne 140-mm rocket launchers MS-227 of the A-22 Ogon complex

NAR launchers can be mounted in the same way, especially since many armies of the world have such experience. The weight and size characteristics of NAR launchers make it possible to place them on almost any ground carrier, even on motorcycles with a sidecar, including remotely controlled ones. robots.

Examples of placement of NAR launchers on various ground carriers

Combat vehicles with NAR launchers can be attached to each company, or even platoon, compensating for the lack of helicopter fire support from the air with ground rocket artillery, especially in combination with UAVs and artillery.

Conclusions

Combat helicopters are one of the most effective means of countering enemy armored vehicles; they can thwart almost any attack by enemy mechanized units, provided that their aircraft dominate the air.

The saturation of the battlefield with air defense systems of all types excludes the operation of a helicopter as a means of fire support for ground units with unguided weapons. It is the anti-tank orientation of combat helicopters that should become the main one, not counting their episodic use for solving special tasks.

Considering the number of short-range air defense systems supplied to Ukraine by Western countries that are present in the NVO zone, and also that despite this, Russian combat helicopters still exist, it can be safely stated that the time of combat helicopters has not yet passed, and that they great future.